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When individuals take part in decision experiments, their answers are typically subject 
to some degree of noise / error / imprecision. There are different ways of modelling this 
stochastic element in the data, and the interpretation of the data can be altered radically, 
depending on the assumptions made about the stochastic specification. This paper 
presents the results of an experiment which gathered data of a kind that has until now 
been in short supply. These data strongly suggest that the 'usual' (Fechnerian) 
assumptions about errors are inappropriate for individual decision experiments. 
Moreover, they provide striking evidence that core preferences display systematic 





Keywords: Error  Imprecision  Preferences  Transitivity  






  Introduction 
Most theories of decision making under risk are expressed in deterministic form, 
as if an individual’s preferences are precise, stable and consistent with some ‘core’ of 
axioms or well-defined components (such as a utility function and/or a probability 
weighting function). Interpreted literally, the implication is that if a particular individual 
is asked to reveal his preference by choosing between two alternatives, G and H, he will 
(except in the very special case of indifference) always make the same choice every 
time the two are offered under the same conditions.  
However, this is in sharp contrast with extensive experimental evidence going 
back more than 50 years which suggests that, when asked to choose between pairs of 
lotteries on two or more occasions within a short period of time, many individuals do 
not always choose the same alternative. Indeed, it is not uncommon to find 15%-30% 
‘switching rates’ in experimental repeated binary choice data (see, for example, 
Mosteller and Nogee, 1951; Luce (1962); Starmer and Sugden, 1989; Camerer, 1989; 
Hey and Orme, 1994; Ballinger and Wilcox, 1997; Loomes and Sugden, 1998). 
This raises two questions. How should we understand and model the observed 
variability in the data? And what are the implications for the way(s) in which we might 
specify and test different ‘core’ theories?  
Most researchers in this area respond to these questions using some variant of a 
‘Fechner’ model. Fechner models assume that each individual gives a subjective value 
(SV) to an object, but that her perception of this value is subject to some degree of 
‘noise’. That is, if we ask the jth individual to value some object G a number of times 
on separated occasions, she will give a set of responses distributed around some central 
tendency. Thus on any particular occasion, the value of G perceived and reported by 
that individual can be denoted by SVGj + εGj where SVGj represents the ‘core’ subjective 
value of G to that individual – this being determined by whatever theory best accounts 
for the way that individual combines payoffs and probabilities – while εGj signifies 
some independent random deviation from the core value on that particular occasion.  
Applying this approach to the situation where the individual is asked to choose 
between two lotteries, G and H, the model entails the choice being made according to 
which lottery is perceived to have the higher value at the moment when the choice is 
made. On those occasions when SVGj + εGj is greater than SVHj + εHj, G is chosen; but, 






  happen to take, there may be occasions when SVGj + εGj is less than SVHj + εHj, in which 
case H is chosen. Thus choice becomes probabilistic, with the probability of G being 
chosen over H, Pr(G ;H), given by: 
 
Pr(G ;H) = Pr( SVGj + εGj > SVHj + εHj  )     (1) 
 
For many economists and econometricians, such a formulation is in line with the 
tradition of taking deterministic core functional forms and simply adding some ‘error’ 
term which has well-established, analytically tractable properties. Not surprisingly, 
then, Fechner models have featured in some form or other in many of the econometric 
analyses of experimental binary choice data. For example, Hey and Orme (1994) 
examined the performance of a number of alternative core theories on the assumption 
that ε is symmetrical around zero and has constant variance. Buschena and Zilberman 
(2000) allowed the variance of ε to be correlated with some measure of the complexity 
of the lotteries being evaluated. And Blavatskyy (2007) considered the implications of 
truncating the distribution of ε in particular ways. If the broad Fechner framework is 
regarded as the appropriate way of modelling the stochastic component in risky 
decisions, all of these variants – and others, perhaps – are potentially admissible: the 
best way of specifying the distribution of ε is then principally a matter of empirical 
investigation
1. 
However, the Fechner approach is not the only way in which a stochastic 
component can be incorporated into decision modelling. Becker, DeGroot and 
Marschak (1963) proposed an alternative random preference (RP) approach. Rather 
than supposing that each person is characterised by just one core preference function, 
RP allows that individuals’ perceptions, moods, attitudes and judgments may fluctuate 
to some extent from one moment to another. So on one occasion an individual may tend 
to feel more optimistic, impulsive, risk seeking, etc., while on a different occasion he 
might focus more on the downside, exhibiting greater caution and risk aversion. Thus it 
is as if an individual’s judgmental apparatus comprises of some continuum of states of 
mind, with each state of mind represented by a (slightly) different preference function. 
For example, someone who is essentially a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility 
                                                 
1 Different assumptions about the distribution of ε can have very different implications: see Loomes 






  (EU) maximiser may, within each state of mind, always weight the utilities of different 
payoffs by their respective probabilities; but different states of mind may be 
characterised by different utility functions, sometimes more concave, sometimes less 
concave or even on occasions convex, reflecting a degree of variability in risk attitude 
from one occasion to another. Thus a particular individual’s preferences might be 
modelled as a distribution over some set of functions, one for each state of mind, with 
any one of these having some probability of being the current state of mind at the time a 
particular judgment is made.  
In a choice between two lotteries, G and H, there may be some functions in the 
set which would favour G over H and others which would favour H over G. The 
probability that an individual chooses G can thus be modelled as the probability of 
drawing at random from the set a preference function which evaluates G more highly 
than H.  
To illustrate how fundamentally the RP approach can differ from the Fechner 
approach, consider the case where the individual is, at core, an EU maximiser and 
where he is presented with a choice between H, which offers a 50-50 chance of 20€ or 
0, and G, which offers a 50-50 chance of 20€ or 5c – that is, G first-order stochastically 
dominates H, although the difference in their expected values is relatively small. 
Under the RP approach, the individual’s state of mind – that is, the particular 
vN-M utility function he applies to the choice – may vary from moment to moment; but 
every one of these functions respects first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD), so that 
whatever his state of mind at the moment of choice, he always prefers G to H: hence  
Pr(G ;H) = 1. 
Under the Fechner approach, SVGj is greater than SVHj. But the difference is 
small, and may be dwarfed by the variances of εGj and εHj, with the result that on a 
substantial minority of occasions, εHj may exceed εGj to a degree which more than 
offsets the difference between SVGj and SVHj. On these occasions, SVGj + εGj < SVHj + 
εHj and the dominated lottery H is chosen. In such cases, then, the Fechner model entails 
a substantial probability (less than 0.5, but conceivably not much less) of observing a 
violation of FOSD. 
  In this respect, such evidence as there is comes much closer to RP than to 
Fechner. For example, Loomes and Sugden (1998) asked 92 respondents to make 45 






  dominated the other, and out of 3,680 (92 x 40) instances, there were 676 cases (18.4%) 
where the choice on the second occasion was different from that on the first. In the other 
5 pairs, one lottery dominated the other, usually by offering a 0.05 higher chance of the 
best payoff and a 0.05 lower chance of the worst payoff. In these pairs, out of a total of 
920 observations (92 respondents each making 5 choices on two occasions), dominance 
was violated in just 13 cases – a rate of less than 1.5%. Under the Fechner approach, 
there is no reason to expect the rate to be so much lower in cases involving dominance: 
indeed, since the differences in expected values were mostly smaller in the pairs 
involving dominance, the rate might, if anything, have been expected to be higher in 
those pairs. Such a low rate can be more readily reconciled with RP (which entails a 0% 
rate) supplemented by the occasional lapse of attention or ‘trembling hand’ kind of 
error
2.  
Of course, it might be argued that if the only shortcoming of the Fechner 
approach were its overprediction of violations of FOSD, that could be finessed by 
assuming (as Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) Prospect Theory does) some prior 
editing phase which identifies and eliminates any transparently dominated options.  
  However, we wished to investigate the robustness and appropriateness of the 
Fechner and RP approaches in other scenarios which did not involve dominance but 
which required trade-offs between the countervailing attractions of different 
alternatives. To that end, we conducted an experiment that would allow us to explore 
other possible differences between those two approaches.    
In the next section we set out the key features of the experimental design and the 
main issues we sought to examine. In section 3, we report the results. These results raise 
serious doubts about the appropriateness of Fechner models in this area and suggest that 
RP may provide a more suitable framework for modelling stochastic decision processes. 
The final section discusses the potentially far-reaching and radical implications of our 
findings. 
 
2. Basic Principles of the Design and the Issues to be Investigated 
At the centre of the experimental design were six lotteries, as listed in Table 1. 
In that table, each lottery is shown in the form: higher payoff, probability of higher 
                                                 
2 Loomes, Moffatt and Sugden (2002) argue that some allowance for such ‘trembles’ may be a useful 






  payoff; lower payoff, probability of lower payoff. In all cases, the payoffs were in 
Euros. 
Table 1 
Label Description  EV Label  Description 
A  84, 0.25; 0, 0.75  21.00  D  60, 0.25; 8, 0.75 
B  36, 0.55; 0, 0.45  19.80  E  36, 0.40; 9, 0.60 
C  22, 0.8; 0, 0.2  17.60  F  20, 0.8; 8, 0.2 
 
These six lotteries constitute three triples, {A, B, C} and {D, E, F}. Within each 
triple, safer lotteries offer lower expected values (EVs). D, E and F respectively offer 
the same EVs as A, B and C, but each involves a smaller spread than its {A, B, C} 
counterpart. For all six lotteries, the individuals in our sample were asked to undertake 
three types of task, as follows: 
BC. Nine different binary choices (BC) were constructed and each choice was 
presented to every respondent on six different occasions (separated from one another by 
being interspersed with the other types of task described below). Those choices were: 
{A, B}, {B, C}, {A, C}, {D, E}, {E, F}, {D, F}, {A, D}, {B, E} and {C, F}.  
ME. For each lottery, each respondent was asked on six different (dispersed) 
occasions to state the sure sum of money that would make them indifferent between that 
sum and the lottery in question. These were the ‘money equivalent’ (ME) questions. 
PE. Every lottery was worth less than 120€, so for each lottery, each respondent 
was asked on six different (dispersed) occasions to state the probability p of receiving 
120€ and the 1-p chance of receiving 0 that would make them indifferent between 
playing the lottery in question and playing that ‘probability equivalent’ (PE) lottery.  
The data from these tasks allow us to examine two respects in which the Fechner 
and RP approaches are liable to differ substantially. These relate to: 1) the relationship 
between the distributions of MEs and PEs; and 2) the relationship between equivalences 
and binary choices. In the next two subsections we expand upon each of these in turn. 
 
2.1: The relationship between the distributions of MEs and PEs 
  We start with the Fechner approach. Within that framework, standard deviations 
for the various lotteries should follow the same pattern for MEs and PEs. 
To see why, consider first MEs. For each individual, any sure amount of money 






  specific about how the variance of ε behaves for such degenerate lotteries
3, we can 
expect that for sufficiently low values of M, the overlap between an individual’s SVM + 
εM and his SVG + εG is negligible, so that he would judge G to be better than those sure 
sums with a probability so close to 1 that he would be extremely unlikely to identify any 
of those sums as money equivalents for the lottery G. But as M is progressively 
increased over some intermediate range where SVM + εM and SVG + εG overlap, it 
becomes increasingly likely that M will be judged at least as good as G. Eventually M 
can be expected to become sufficiently high for these be no consequential overlap at the 
other end of the SVG + εG distribution, so that the individual would be extremely 
unlikely to judge G to be as good as these high values.  
If the εGs and εMs are distributed symmetrically around zero means, the 
probability of M being judged at least as good as G reaches 50% at the point where SVM 
= SVG. Thus, so long as the preference functions are not highly nonlinear over the 
relevant range, it might be a reasonable approximation to suppose that the distribution 
of MEs is roughly symmetrical around a mean/median value located where SVM = SVG, 
with the variance of this distribution reflecting the joint distribution of εM and εG. If 
nonlinearities result in substantial asymmetries in the distribution of MEs – something 
we can examine – there might be an argument for taking the median as the better 
measure of central tendency
4. 
Second, if different lotteries are associated with markedly different distributions 
of ε, we might expect to see this reflected in the distributions of their MEs. For 
example, suppose that the variance of εH is greater than the variance of εG. Under 
Fechnerian assumptions, for every M the joint distribution of εM and εH will have 
greater variance than the joint distribution of εM and εG, so that we might expect the 
variance of MEs for H to be greater than the variance of MEs for G. So if this were the 
appropriate error model, it might allow us to gain insights into the features of lotteries 
that are associated with different variances of ε.  
Now consider the PEs. Let us denote the ‘yardstick’ lottery (offering 120€ with 
probability p and 0 with probability 1-p) by Y. The distributions of the εY’s associated 
                                                 
3 One possibility, consistent with much psychophysical work, is that the variance increases somewhat as 
the magnitude of M increases. Another possibility, advocated by Blavatskyy (2007) – although without 
any cited empirical foundation – is that the variance for any sure sum is zero. 
4 Under EUT, for example, it could be that u(.) is markedly concave so that a symmetrical distribution of 
perceived expected utilities may map to a distribution of MEs with a longer right tail: in which case, the 






  with the values of p that span the relevant range may be different from the distributions 
of the εM’s over the corresponding range. So the PEs for G might be distributed rather 
differently than the MEs for G, reflecting the possibility that the joint distributions of εG 
and εY could be rather different from the corresponding joint distributions of εG and εM.  
Nevertheless, we should still expect to observe PEs exhibiting the same 
regularities as just outlined for the MEs: whatever similarities or differences in the 
standard deviations of the ME distributions are observed between G and H, we should 
expect (broadly) the same similarities or differences to be manifested in the standard 
deviations of the PE distributions for those same lotteries. For example, if the standard 
deviation of an individual’s MEs were to decline progressively from A to B to C, we 
should, under the Fechner model, suppose this to reflect a tendency for the variance of 
εC to be less than the variance of εB which, in turn, is less than the variance of εA. But if 
that is the case, the joint distributions of εY with each of the lottery error terms should 
vary correspondingly, so that we should also expect some progressive decline in the 
standard deviations of that individual’s PEs as we move from A to B to C.  
How does this compare with the implication of RP? Under RP, it is quite 
straightforward to model equivalence judgments. Suppose an individual is asked on a 
particular occasion to state a sure payoff M such that he is indifferent between the 
certainty of that payoff and playing out lottery G. RP models this as if one of that 
individual’s preference functions is picked at random from his set of such functions and 
the individual then states the M corresponding with that function. Different functions 
are liable to entail different values of M, so that the distribution of those functions 
generates a distribution of MEGs for that individual.  
  Exactly the same reasoning applies to PE. For each preference function in the set 
that characterises that individual, there will be some probability of the yardstick payoff 
which will make the individual indifferent between G and Y. Denoting that probability 
by pG, the probability distribution over the set of preference functions maps to some 
distribution of pGs. This applies to any core theory which entails the existence of PEs 
(and MEs) for any and all lotteries: the likelihood that a particular PE is stated is simply 
the likelihood that, at the moment when the decision is made, an individual is in a state 
of mind corresponding to a preference function that entails a mapping between the 






  However, in order to go further and generate some testable hypotheses that can 
be contrasted with those emanating from the Fechner framework, we need to place 
some restriction on the distribution of any individual’s preference functions. A fairly 
permissive restriction in keeping with conventional wisdom would be to suppose that 
each individual’s core theory respects transitivity and that all of the preference functions 
in his set can be ordered according to some measure of risk attitude.  
Under these assumptions, suppose that the decision maker is asked to undertake 
choice and equivalence tasks involving two binary lotteries, G and H, where both the 
variance and expected value of G is greater than for H. For some preference functions at 
the risk-seeking/risk-neutral/less risk-averse end of the distribution, the higher EV of G 
is sufficient for G ; H, whereas some functions at the more risk-averse end of the 
spectrum entail H ; G. Let the proportion of functions that entail G ; H be denoted by 
α: then α is the probability of observing G ; H on any occasion when the individual is 
asked to make a BC, while we can expect to observe H ; G with probability 1−α.  
Now suppose we draw a representative sample of an individual’s MEs for each 
lottery
5. Were we to happen to draw the function where G ~ H, it would give the same 
ME for G as for H: call this value M*. All less risk-averse functions would give MEs 
for both lotteries that are above M*, but for each of those functions, G ; H, so that the 
MEG would be higher than the corresponding MEH. On the other hand, for all functions 
involving greater risk aversion than the one where G ~ H, the MEs would all be less 
than M*; and for each of those functions, MEG < MEH. Under these conditions, a 
representative sample of that individual’s MEs would exhibit a greater standard 
deviation for MEG than for MEH. 
If α > 0.5, the median function would entail G ; H, and we should expect the 
median MEG to be greater than the median MEH (and if the underlying distribution were 
not very far from symmetrical and if the sample sizes were adequate, we might also 
expect the means to reflect the same inequality). If α < 0.5, the median function would 
entail H ; G so that the opposite inequality would hold between medians (and probably 
means). But of course, the earlier conclusion about the direction of inequality of the 
standard deviations of the MEs would be unaffected. 
                                                 
5 Notice that the assumption being made here is that the same probability distribution over an individual’s 
utility functions applies to any type of task. This is not the only assumption that might be made, but it is 
the working assumption we shall operate with at present. In footnote 12 we shall briefly discuss a 






  What about the PEs? Consider again the function where G ~ H. This entails 
some probability p* such that PEG = PEH. For all functions involving less risk aversion, 
the probability of the yardstick payoff would be lower than p* for both lotteries; but 
since G ; H for each such function, the corresponding PEG would be higher than its 
PEH counterpart. In other words, for the subsample of functions from the less risk-
averse portion of the distribution, the PEHs would tend to take even lower values than 
the PEGs. On the other hand, for any function from the more risk averse part of the 
distribution, the probabilities of the yardstick payoffs would be greater than p*; and 
since these functions entail H ; G, the PEHs would here tend to take even higher values 
than the PEGs. Taking the distribution as a whole, then, we could expect the standard 
deviation of a sample of an individual’s PEHs to be greater than the standard deviation 
of a comparable sample of that individual’s PEGs. 
This relationship between the standard deviations for the PEs is in the opposite 
direction to our expectation for the MEs and provides a sharp contrast with the 
implications of Fechner models, which suppose that the variances of εG and εH are 
primarily determined by the characteristics of the lotteries and that any differences 
between them will tend to manifest themselves in much the same way via MEs as via 
PEs. This is a contrast our experimental data will allow us to examine. 
 
2.2: The relationship between equivalences and binary choices.  
Within the terms of the Fechner framework, the degrees of overlap between any 
two sets of ME (alternatively, PE) responses should broadly correlate with the 
frequencies of choice in the repeated BC tasks. 
If the relationship between the SVG + εG distribution and the SVH + εH 
distribution is such that (say) G is chosen over H significantly more than 50% of the 
time, we should, at the very least, expect the median (and probably the mean) ME for G 
to be higher than the median (mean) ME for H. We should expect the same with PE. 
However, we may be able to go further than simply expecting the median/mean 
MEs and PEs to be ordered in the same way as each other and in line with the majority 
of choices between any two lotteries. If the distributions of MEs and PEs can be thought 
of as proxies for the SV + ε distributions, the relationships between those distributions 
for any two lotteries might allow us to proxy choice probabilities. For example, if the 






  drawn at random from its distribution would be greater than an MEH drawn at random 
from its distribution, one might expect this to be indicative of SVG + εG being greater 
than SVH + εH about 60% of the time, so that under Fechnerian assumptions G would be 
chosen in roughly 60% of choice repetitions. Similarly, we should expect the choice 
proportions to be broadly in line with the probability that a randomly-drawn PEG will be 
greater than an independently sampled PEH. Because of the involvement of the εM’s and 
εY’s, this correspondence may not be exact; but under Fechner assumptions, one would 
expect to find the probabilities inferred from equivalences and those observed in 
repeated choice being not too greatly out of alignment
6. 
By contrast, the RP approach allows the possibility of very considerable 
disparities between the extent to which equivalences overlap and the pattern of binary 
choice. This was illustrated earlier in the case where G first-order stochastically 
dominated H, but only by a small amount, so that MEG > MEH and PEG > PEH just over 
50% of the time but G ; H in direct binary choice on 100% of occasions (except, 
perhaps, for ‘trembles’). However, in response to the suggestion that FOSD is a rather 
special and unusual situation which might be dealt with by some prior editing 
procedure, it is quite easy to construct cases which do not involve FOSD but where RP 
would allow considerable disparities between the choices we observe and those we 
might infer from the overlaps of equivalences. 
For example, consider the choice between our lottery C = (22, 0.8; 0, 0.2) and 
our lottery F = (20, 0.8; 8, 0.2). Both have the same expected value of 17.60, so we 
could expect the two distributions of MEs to have a considerable degree of overlap; and 
likewise for the two distributions of PEs. But suppose (as is commonly done) that most 
individuals are predominantly risk averse, which in RP terms means that their 
preferences are characterised by sets of utility functions where the (great) majority are 
concave. Every concave function will entail F ; C, so that we might expect to find F 
chosen very much more often than the overlapping of the equivalence distributions 
would suggest. A similar argument applies to the {B, E} and {A, D} pairs. Substantial 
disparities of this kind would be compatible with RP, but would be contrary to 
Fechnerian models. 
                                                 
6 If the utilities of sure sums of money are perceived with no noise/error, as assumed in Blavatskyy 
(2007), the correspondence between distributions of MEs and distributions of perceived SVs is exact; if 
the variance of ε is positive and liable to change with the magnitudes of the utilities (and perhaps with 






   
3. The Experiment – Implementation and Results 
  Every participant was required to attend two sessions, several days apart, during 
a three-week period in March/April 2008. Each session followed the same format. 
Having signed in and read the instructions (see Appendix 1), each participant answered 
63 questions per session, organised in three successive ‘phases’, each consisting of the 
same 21 questions, as follows: 6 MEs, one for each of the six lotteries; 6 PEs, one for 
each of the six lotteries; and 9 binary choices. All MEs and PEs were elicited using an 
iterative choice format (see Appendix 1 for details and examples of displays) in order to 
make them as procedurally similar to BCs as possible. We gave no feedback until all 
tasks had been completed, at which point we paid each respondent on the basis of 
playing out one of those decisions picked at random at the very end of the experiment. 
Standard incentive mechanisms were used (again, see Appendix 1 for details).  
A total of 274 individuals completed the full set of decisions
7. In the way 
equivalences were elicited, we deliberately did not ‘force’ either ME or PE responses to 
respect stochastic dominance because we wanted to see how people behaved if 
unconstrained. In the course of the two sessions, there were 54 occasions when it was 
possible for each respondent to violate FOSD, either by stating an ME equal to or 
higher than the high payoff of the lottery being valued or equal to or less than the lower 
payoff (in the cases of D, E and F), or else by stating a PE at least as high as the 
probability of the high payoff in the {A, B, C} lotteries. The tables in the rest of this 
paper are based on the unedited responses of all 274 participants, including some 
responses that violate FOSD. However, in order to anticipate any concerns that such 
responses may be ‘driving’ the patterns in our data, we have also computed all tables 
using only the responses from individuals who never violated FOSD. These tables are 
presented in Appendix 2. They show that none of the patterns we report, nor the 
conclusions drawn from them, are materially altered when we apply even the fiercest 
exclusion criterion: indeed, if anything, the conclusions come through even more 
powerfully, since by excluding a number of outliers we reduce the standard errors used 
in various of the statistical tests and increase the corresponding significance levels. 
 
 
                                                 







  3.1: Results relating to the relationship between the distributions of MEs and PEs 
In order to examine the relationship between the distributions of MEs and PEs 
and the contrasts between Fechner and RP outlined in subsection 2.1 above, for each 
respondent and for each lottery we computed the mean, median and standard deviation 
of the six ME responses – labelled, respectively, ‘meanME’, ‘medME’ and ‘sdevME’ – 
and the corresponding ‘meanPE’, ‘medPE’ and ‘sdevPE’ for each set of six PE 
responses. Table 2 reports the sample averages for these variables, plus the sample 
medians of the standard deviations, with those standard deviations in the middle rows 
for easier comparison between MEs and PEs. 
 
Table 2: Key Statistics for Money Equivalents and Probability Equivalents 
 
Lottery A B C D E F 
        
Average  meanME 20.93 17.48 15.09 20.93 18.82 15.50 
Average  medME  20.60 17.28 15.10 20.73 18.76 15.43 
        
Average  sdevME 4.43 3.17 2.51 4.08 2.97 2.24 
Median  sdevME  3.40 2.64 2.28 3.38 2.39 1.73 
        
Average  sdevPE  3.29 5.48 7.32 6.42 6.20 7.33 
Median  sdevPE  2.16 4.33 5.70 4.08 4.91 6.30 
        
Average  meanPE  18.33 25.27 28.45 23.79 25.66 29.37 
Average  medPE  18.05 24.88 27.94 23.24 25.23 29.05 
 
This table enables us to see whether the trends in standard deviations follow the 
same pattern for MEs as for PEs, as the Fechner framework would suggest, or whether 
they move in opposite directions, as we might expect under RP.  
For MEs, we find that as we move from A to B to C, and also as we move from 
D to E to F, standard deviations reduce to an extent that is highly significant (p < 0.001) 
in every pairwise comparison within each triple. By contrast, the standard deviations of 
PE responses show a strong tendency to change in the opposite direction: of the six 
binary comparisons of sdevPEs within the two triples, only the difference between D 
and E is in the same direction as for MEs (although insignificantly so), while the 






  are significant at the 0.1% level
8. It is hard to see how such strong opposite trends in the 
standard deviations can be reconciled with any variant of the Fechner approach – and 
certainly not any in the existing literature of which we are aware. 
 
3.1: Results relating to the relationship between equivalences and binary choices 
In order to examine the relationship between equivalences and binary choices 
and the contrasts between Fechner and RP outlined in subsection 2.2 above, we collated 
the BC data as follows. For each respondent, we observed the number of times out of 6 
repetitions that he/she chose the riskier lottery – that is, the one with the greater spread 
(always labelled alphabetically earlier than the safer lottery) – within each pair.  
 
Table 3: Binary Choice Distributions 
 
{R, S}  Frequency of Choice of  Riskier Lottery    
Pair  6 5 4 3 2 1 0  Total  R:S 
{A, B}  25 19 20 31 33 41  105  525: 1119 
{B, C}  20 17 25 29 37 50 96  516: 1128 
{A, C}  36 20 16 28 31 41  102  567:1077 
{D, E}  78 42 55 30 25 24 20  1062: 582 
{E, F}  55 43 44 33 39 25 35 923: 721 
{D, F}  80 31 44 36 23 28 32 993: 651 
{A, D}  17 16 15 14 21 55  136  381: 1263 
{B, E}  9  7  10 10 16 42  180  233: 1411 
{C, F}  2 1 -- 3 4  21  243  55: 1589 
 
 
For each pair, Table 3 shows the 274 individuals categorised accordingly: that is, 
the column headed ‘6’ shows how many respondents chose the riskier lottery on all 6 
occasions; the column headed ‘5’ shows how many chose the riskier lottery on five 
occasions and chose the safer lottery just once; and so on through to those in the column 
headed ‘0’ who never chose the riskier lottery but chose the safer alternative every time 
                                                 
8 As can be seen in the corresponding table in Appendix 2, removing cases where FOSD is violated has 
the effect of reducing all standard deviations, while bringing the direction of change of the average 
sdevPE from D to E in line with the other five pairwise comparisons – although this difference remains 






  they faced that binary choice. The total number of times the riskier (R) and safer (S) 
lotteries were chosen is shown in the far right hand column. 
  It is immediately apparent that there is considerable variability at the individual 
level, while at the same time there are some very definite and quite intuitive trends. For 
each of the three {A, B, C} pairs, the overall majority of choices clearly favour the safer 
alternative, as shown in the far-right column. Even so, for each pair only about half of 
the respondents make the same choice consistently on all six occasions.  
Turning to the {D, E, F} pairs, the effect of raising the minimum payoffs to 8€ 
or 9€ and reducing the spreads of these lotteries relative to their {A, B, C} counterparts 
is to cause the majority of choices now to favour the higher-EV alternatives in each 
case. Here, though, there is somewhat less within-person consistency, with only about 
40% of respondents making the same choice on all six occasions.  
Finally, when the EVs are equalised, as in the last three pairs, there are very 
substantial majorities favouring the safer alternatives, most strikingly in the {C, F} 
choice. So despite the clear evidence of variability in people’s choices, there are also 
many signs of systematic tendencies underlying their behaviour. 
How do the patterns of choice compare with the overlaps between equivalences? 
We focus on the three pairs {A, D}, {B, E} and {C, F} where the alternatives within 
each pair shared the same EV and differed only in terms of their spreads. 
For each individual and for each pair of lotteries, we compared each individual’s 
six MEs for one lottery with each of her six MEs for the other lottery. We recorded the 
number of comparisons in which the ME of the riskier lottery (MER) was strictly higher 
than the ME of the safer lottery (MES), the number of occasions when MER = MES, and 
the number of times when MER < MES. Since there were 36 comparisons for each of 
274 respondents, the total number of comparisons per pair of lotteries is 9864. The 














  Table 4: Comparing MERs with MESs 
 
Lottery Pair  MER > MES MER = MES MER < MES 
 
























It is immediately apparent that the BC distributions are very different from those 
implied by the overlaps of equivalences. On the basis of the ME responses, A should 
have been preferred to D at least 42.9% of the time in direct choice (that minimum 
figure being based on the rather extreme assumption that all cases where MEA = MED 
are interpreted as favouring D in direct choice). But in fact A was chosen in just over 
23% of direct BCs. Similarly, the ME data suggest that B should be preferred to E on at 
least 31.9% of occasions, whereas the actual proportion was less than half of that 
(14.2%). The {C, F} case provides an even more striking contrast: whereas MEC > MEF 
in more than 41% of comparisons, C is chosen only 55 times out of 1644 – a rate of less 
than 3.5%. These disparities are entirely in keeping with RP, but are incompatible with 
any Fechner formulation of which we are aware. 
 
3.3: Results relating to the assumption of transitivity  
  The propositions and implications set out in subsections 2.1 and 2.2 were 
derived on the basis of fairly general assumptions about core preferences that might 
apply to many non-EU models as well as to EU: in particular, that core preference 
functions are transitive and can, for any individual, be ordered according to some 
measure of risk attitude. On that basis, we considered some contrasting implications of 
Fechner and RP approaches for the distributions of ME, PE and BC responses and the 
relationships between them. And on this basis, the evidence from the experiment 
strongly and consistently appeared to favour RP rather than any form of Fechner error 
term.  
  However, the data in Tables 2 and 3 give grounds for questioning the 
assumption of transitivity. In Table 2, the mean and median MEs order the lotteries in 






  the mean and median PEs produce exactly the opposite orderings within each triple. 
Meanwhile, Table 3 shows aggregate patterns of binary choices that do not fit either 
with MEs or with PEs: for each pair in the {A, B, C} triple, the majority choices favour 
the safer options, which is in line with the PEs but is contrary to the MEs; while for 
every pair in the {D, E, F} triple, the majority choices favour the riskier options, which 
tallies with MEs but runs counter to PEs.  
Of course, those tables report aggregate data, whereas an examination of 
transitivity really requires individual-level analysis. In particular, as argued in Section 2, 
if individuals’ underlying preference functions can be ordered according to some 
measure of risk attitude, we should expect individuals’ median responses to provide 
insights into the nature of the functions at the centre of those distributions. If such 
functions entailed transitivity, we should expect this to be reflected at the level of the 
individual by the correspondence between median MEs, median PEs and majority 
choices. 
The relevant individual-level analysis is reported in Table 5, which categorises 
all 274 respondents according to their median ME, median PE and majority BC 
responses to each pair, with R and S referring, respectively, to the riskier and safer 
lotteries in each pairing.  
 
Table 5: Conjunctions of Median Responses 
 
Direction of Median  Lottery Pairs 
ME PE PC  {A, B}  {B, C}  {A, C}  {D, E}  {E, F}  {D, F} 
R ≥ S  R ≥ S  R ≥ S  36 48 57 80 73 84 
R ≥ S  R ≥ S  R  <  S  20 46 12 12 29 13 
R > S  R < S  R ≥ S  46 25 38 73 87 92 
R > S  R < S  R < S  102  70  105  28  54  49 
R < S  R > S  R > S  0  4  1  11  5  6 
R < S  R > S  R ≤ S  0  16  1 8 5 5 
R ≤ S  R ≤ S  R  >  S  6 5 1  33  5 3 
R ≤ S  R ≤ S  R ≤ S  64 60 59 29 16 22 
 
So, for example, the top cell in the {A, B} column shows that 36 of the 274 






  PEA at least as high as their median PEB and chose A over B on at least 3 of the six 
occasions they were presented with that choice. Such behaviour displays the kind of 
consistency that a transitive core theory would entail. The 20 in the next cell down 
favoured A both in terms of MEs and PEs but chose B on at least four of the six BC 
repetitions; while the 46 in the third cell chose A on at least 3 occasions and had median 
MEA’s strictly higher than their median MEB’s, but their median PEA’s were strictly 
lower than their median PEB’s. And so on.  
By summing the numbers in the top and bottom rows, we can see how many 
individuals were weakly consistent with some transitive core preference for each pair. 
The emphasis shifts from the bottom row to the top row as we move from {A, B, C} to 
{D, E, F} but the total is fairly stable, always lying between 89 and 116 i.e. between 
32.5% and 42.5% of the sample. 
  Thus for most pairs, more than 60% of the sample violated transitivity in one 
way or another. However, the ways in which they did so do not appear to be randomly 
distributed. On the contrary, they exhibit certain systematic patterns, as follows. 
  First, we observe the analogue to the classic preference reversal phenomenon 
where people choose one option but place a higher money equivalent on the other. In 
the literature – see Seidl (2002) – there is a clear asymmetry whereby it is relatively 
common to observe people placing a higher money value on the riskier option but 
choosing the safer option in the BC task (in our terms, median MER > median MES 
together with majority S ; R) but it is relatively rare to observe people valuing the 
safer option more highly while choosing the riskier option (i.e. median MES > median 
MER together with R ; S). In fact, taking the pairs in the left-to-right order of the 
columns in Table 5, the ratios we observe are 122:6, 116:9, 117:2, 40:44, 83:10 and 
62:9: that is, with one exception, very strongly exhibiting the classic preference reversal 
asymmetry, especially among the {A, B, C} pairs where the safer options were more 
often chosen
9.   
  Although probability equivalents have been much less often studied, Butler and 
Loomes (2007) reported the opposite asymmetry when PEs and choices were compared. 
For the pair of lotteries they investigated, they found that instances where individuals 
chose the safer option but placed a higher PE on the riskier option were outnumbered by 
                                                 
9 The corresponding table in Appendix 2, which excludes cases where a lottery is overvalued to the extent 
that the stated ME is greater than the high payoff, shows fewer reversals of both kinds: the corresponding 
ratios are 69:4, 70:6, 68:2, 24:26, 50:3 and 40:5. Thus even when all violations of FOSD are excluded, 






  the opposite combination of choosing the riskier option while placing a higher PE on 
the safer one. For the six pairs in Table 5, the analogous ratios using majority choices 
and median PEs are: 13:35, 54:20, 11:25, 15:87, 29:72 and 12:74; thus, with one 
exception, these ratios show the same direction of asymmetry reported in Butler and 
Loomes (2007), with those asymmetries being much more pronounced for the {D, E, F} 
pairs where the riskier options were more often chosen
10. 
  Finally, the most striking and comprehensive asymmetry of all emerges from the 
conjunction of MEs and PEs. If we compare the numbers of individuals for whom 
median MER > MES but median PER < PES with those for whom median MER < MES 
but median PER > PES, we obtain the following ratios: 148:0, 95:20, 143:2, 101:19, 
141:10 and 141:11
11. 
  Remembering that these data are based on medians and majority responses – that 
is, they do not depend on single and possibly aberrant responses – we cannot see any 
way within the modelling framework outlined above that these patterns can be 
reconciled with a model which assumes that the great majority of individuals’ decisions 
in such tasks reflect an essentially transitive core. 
 
4. Discussion 
The data presented in subsection 3.3 constitute powerful evidence against 
transitivity. This presents us with a Duhem-Quine problem: our basis for distinguishing 
between Fechner and RP involved the auxiliary assumption that any core theory was 
transitive (and in the case of RP, the additional assumption that preference functions 
could be ordered by risk attitude). If we have reason to doubt the assumption about the 
transitivity of core preferences, can we continue to be so confident that the Fechner 
framework is inferior to RP? 
  We think we can. Indeed, if core preferences are so often intransitive, that may 
constitute a further argument for doubting the appropriateness of applying the Fechner 
framework to experimental data about equivalences and choices between lotteries. To 
see why, consider what is involved in any core theory that allows systematic 
intransitivities. Intrinsic to such a theory is the idea that the evaluation of any lottery is 
liable to vary systematically from one context / choice set / decision task to another, so 
                                                 
10 After excluding cases where FOSD was violated, the corresponding ratios are 7:24, 38:12, 6:17, 7:64, 
20:32 and 8:36.   






  that G may be evaluated more favourably than H against sure amounts of money while 
H may be evaluated more favourably than G in a direct choice between the two and/or 
against some yardstick lottery. In other words, the assumption underpinning the Fechner 
approach – that the perceived SV of an object to an individual is purely a matter of how 
the characteristics of that object interact with the evaluation apparatus of the individual 
– does not hold. Trying to graft some form of independent Fechner error onto core 
preferences which allow systematic intransitivities as a result of contextual interactions 
would appear to involve a fundamental conceptual mismatch.  
By contrast, the holistic processing of a decision task is entirely in keeping with 
the spirit of the RP model. The notion of a ‘state of mind’ entails both (all) alternatives 
being processed together and on the same basis on any given occasion. The effect of 
imposing transitivity is not to rule out such processing but rather to require that the 
results of evaluating two or more alternatives in conjunction with one another is 
indistinguishable from evaluating them separately and/or in conjunction with any/all 
other sets of options. Core theories which dispense with transitivity typically involve 
specifying the nature of interactions between alternatives which lead to systematic 
variations in the way the evaluation of a prospect is affected by the parameters of the 
other prospects in a particular set. Clearly, such interactions entail at least some degree 
of joint processing of the kind intrinsic to the RP approach. An RP specification of a 
non-transitive core theory is therefore very natural, and simply involves the extent of 
certain interactions varying from one occasion to another
12. 
  It is not our intention to say much more here about the detailed nature of an 
intransitive core theory that might fit the data
13. Rather, the main focus of the present 
paper is upon the appropriate specification of the variability in most of our participants’ 
                                                 
12 However, it has occurred to us that there is a somewhat different approach that might reconcile the data 
with an RP formulation of some transitive core theory, as follows. Suppose that an individual’s 
preferences are represented by some distribution of (say) von Neumann-Morgenstern u(.) functions, but 
that instead of sampling randomly from the same distribution for all types of task, the nature of the task 
biases the sampling in some way(s). In order to produce the patterns we have observed, it would need to 
be the case that the ME task prompts respondents to sample more heavily from the more risk-seeking/less 
risk-averse end of the distribution, while the PE task results in oversampling from the more risk averse 
end of the distribution, with binary choices perhaps being based on a sample somewhere between those 
other two. This kind of explanation would move us away from the more formal decision theoretic 
framework that underpins our analysis and towards something more in the ‘heuristics and biases’ 
(Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982) tradition. We put such a possibility ‘on the table’ as something 
that may merit future investigation, although we do not pursue it further in this paper.  
13 We can say that regret theory does not appear to fit the bill – in Butler and Loomes (2007) it was 
shown that regret theory is at odds with the form of PE-BC reversal found there and replicated in our 
data. One of the authors has proposed a model which does appear capable of accommodating that form of 
reversal alongside the classic ME-BC phenomenon – see Loomes (2010) – but it will require a much 






  ME, PE and BC responses. Taken as a whole, our evidence strongly suggests that 
Fechner specifications are simply inappropriate.  
  The implications of such a conclusion are radical and potentially far-reaching. 
First, it raises serious doubts about much of the work to date that has used Fechner 
models to try to fit preference functions and to judge the relative merits of EU against 
other ‘core’ theories. If the whole Fechner approach is fundamentally inappropriate for 
these data, any estimates generated on the basis of such mis-specified error models and 
any inferences drawn from them must be regarded as questionable. 
Second, the use of Fechner models has not been restricted to the analysis of data 
from individual decision experiments. As discussed in Loomes (2005) and Bardsley et 
al. (2009, Chapter 7), the ‘quantal response equilibrium’ (QRE) concept, developed by 
McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1998) and applied to numerous datasets generated by 
experimental games, is also an essentially Fechnerian model. If the Fechner approach is 
the wrong way of modelling the stochastic component of individual behaviour in the 
face of ‘games against nature’, it may also be the wrong way of modelling the stochastic 
component in individuals’ behaviour when they are playing games against other 
individuals; and this may cast doubt on the robustness of QRE-based ways of fitting the 
data from experimental games and the inferences drawn from doing so.  
Third, essentially the same assumptions underpin a much wider body of 
empirical and theoretical ‘discrete choice’ research (see Manski, 2001): if the model is 
unsound in the context of individual decisions about simple lotteries, how confident can 
we be about its suitability in many other areas where ‘stated preference’ methods have 
been used to guide private and public decision making? 
  Of course, it would be premature to discard a large body of existing literature on 
the basis of a single experimental study, no matter how striking the results of this study 
appear to be. Further work is clearly required in order to establish the robustness of our 
findings and explore the extent of their applicability. However, if such further work 
confirms our key findings and shows that they carry over into strategic behaviour and 
into other areas of preference elicitation, the implications are fundamental: techniques 
and results predicated upon Fechnerian assumptions may no longer be viable in these 
fields and we shall need in future to formulate hypotheses, conduct statistical tests, fit 
core functional forms and derive estimates of parameters in ways consistent with RP 
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  Appendix 1: Overview of the Experiment 
 
Subjects and design 
 
Participants in the experiment were students at three different Spanish universities: 
Vigo, Pablo de Olavide (Seville) and Murcia. The total number of people recruited was 
319 (103 in Vigo, 144 in Murcia and 72 in Seville). Recruitment of participants took 
place during the 2 weeks before the experiment started: signs were posted in 
researchers’ faculties and they also went to the classrooms to explain the aim of the 
experiment briefly and encourage participation. 
 
The experiment was computer-based. Each participant had to attend two experimental 
sessions separated by at least 1 week. 45 subjects did not show up for the second 
session leaving the total sample as 274. There were two interviewers present during the 




The questionnaire was divided into three stages. In the first stage subjects were asked to 
enter their names, age, and gender. This request was for ensuring that responses of the 
same individual in the two sessions were correctly linked. They were then told that the 
experiment aimed to investigate how people make a series of choices between two 
options. It was explained that, in addition to a €5 ‘show-up’ fee, there would also be a 
payment based on their decisions: at the end of the second session, one of their 
decisions would be retrieved and played out for real money. Because the payment 
depended on just one decision, participants were advised that it was in their interests to 
make each choice in a way that most accurately reflected their true preferences.  
 
In the second stage, subjects were presented with three practice questions. Each of these 
questions illustrated the different types of question that participants would see in the 
third stage. The instructions for each type of question were displayed on the computer 
screen and they were also read aloud by the researchers. After being given an 
opportunity to clarify anything they were uncertain about, subjects were invited to 
proceed to the third stage. 
 
The final stage consisted of nine sequences of questions, grouped in three blocks, 21 
questions each. These questions were the same for the three blocks. The order in which 
the questions were administered within each block was as follows: first, there were 6 
Money Equivalence (ME) questions; next, 6 Probability Equivalence (PE) questions; 
and finally, 9 Binary Choices (BC). Therefore each participant repeated this set of 21 
tasks three times within each session – so, six times over the two sessions.  
 
The Three Types of Question 
 
Each ME question elicited the amount of money €XME that made a subject indifferent 
between €XME for certain and a lottery giving €X1 with probability p and €X2 with 













For each alternative, the bar was divided in proportion to the probability attached to the 
relevant payoff. For Option A (the lottery) the chance of winning the higher outcome 
(€84 in the example) was always coloured in green. The lower outcome (€0 in the 
example) was in red. As Option B only offered one sure amount, the entire bar was in 
green. Participants were asked to press “A” or “B” buttons until they considered both 
options equally attractive in terms of their preferences. Whenever the “A” button was 
pressed, the sure sum of money was increased, making Option B more desirable. The 
reverse occurred when subjects pressed the “B” button. Once subjects felt that they 
were indifferent between the two options, they registered this and moved on to the next 
question by pressing the “Continue” button.   
 
Each PE question elicited the probability q that made the subject indifferent between a 
particular lottery and an alternative lottery giving €120 with probability q and €0 with 



















The procedure to reach the indifference point was essentially the same as for the ME 
questions. So, when the subject indicated a preference for the fixed lottery by pressing 
the “A” button, the probability attached to €120 in Option B increased; and the opposite 
happened when the “B” button was pressed. When indifference was reached, the subject 
pressed “Continue” to register that value and move to the next question. 
 
The BC questions presented subjects with two fixed lotteries and asked them to make a 











The Incentive System 
 
After a subject had completed all questions in both sessions, one of his/her decisions 
was picked at random: it was equally likely to be any question from either of the two 
sessions. If it was a BC question, he/she simply played out whichever lottery s/he had 
chosen. If it was an equivalence question, an ‘offer’ – some sure sum of money in the 
case of an ME question, or a lottery offering some probability of €120 in the case of a 
PE question – was drawn at random: if this was as good as, or better than, the stated 
indifference sum/probability, the individual either received the full amount of the sure 
money offer or else played out the €120 lottery offered. If the offer was worse than the 









  Appendix 2: Results Tables After Exclusions (n = 165) 
 
 
Table 2: Key Statistics for Money Equivalents and Probability Equivalents 
Lottery A B C D E F 
        
Average  meanME 20.30 17.15 14.91 20.99 18.88 15.48 
Average  medME  20.20 17.00 15.02 20.87 18.84 15.52 
        
Average  sdevME 3.55 2.49 1.98 3.21 2.28 1.49 
Median  sdevME  2.88 2.15 1.80 2.89 2.01 1.41 
        
Average  sdevPE  1.81 3.98 5.93 4.91 4.98 6.20 
Median  sdevPE  1.64 3.22 4.83 3.33 3.78 5.24 
        
Average  meanPE  16.96 23.27 26.21 22.61 24.46 27.29 





Table 3: Binary Choice Distributions 
{R, S}  Frequency of Choice of  Riskier Lottery    
Pair  6 5 4 3 2 1 0  Total  R:S 
{A, B}  17 12 15 19 14 26 62 333  :  657 
{B, C}  16 11 15 12 22 22 67 313  :  677 
{A, C}  27 13  7  17 16 27 58 365  :  625 
{D, E}  54 27 34 16 13 11 10 680  :  310 
{E, F}  37 25 27 20 15 19 22 564  :  426 
{D, F}  57 20 20 21 15 15 17 630  :  360 
{A, D}  10  13 8  3 12  32  87  222  :  768 
{B, E}  5  3  9  5  10  17  116  133 : 857 










  Table 4: Comparing MERs with MESs 
Lottery Pair  MER > MES MER = MES MER < MES 
 



























Table 5: Conjunctions of Median Responses 
Direction of Median  Lottery Pairs 
ME PE BC  {A, B}  {B, C}  {A, C}  {D, E}  {E, F}  {D, F} 
R ≥ S  R ≥ S  R ≥ S  26 32 39 52 63 62 
R ≥ S  R ≥ S  R < S  10  31  7  7  18  10 
R > S  R < S  R ≥ S  32 14 25 53 42 50 
R > S  R < S  R < S  59  39  61  17  32  30 
R < S  R > S  R > S  0  3  1  7  2  4 
R < S  R > S  R ≤ S  0  11  0 1 4 2 
R ≤ S  R ≤ S  R  >  S  4 3 1  19  1 1 
R ≤ S  R ≤ S  R ≤ S  37 35 34 12  6  9 
 
 
 
 
 
 